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In December 1968, Frank Wilder presented a paper in a Carolina-USAID 
Workshop on ‘Mass Communications in Family Planning.’ This was, perhaps, 
the first time he presented the inverted “Red Triangle” to the developing world. 
As a consultant to the Ford Foundation’s India Office focused on Mass 
Communications for Family Planning, he had been working on the symbol for the 
past three years. In his paper, he added a note that the symbol was now ready for 
circulation across the ‘developing countries’ or what we know as the Global 
South. He writes:  
 
“While we are primarily 
concerned with the development 
of a mass communications 
strategy at the national level, 
many of our conclusions will be 
applicable to family planning 
programs in smaller political and 
administrative subdivisions of the 
country, such as States, 
provinces, districts and cities.”1 
Figure 1 The Inverted Red Triangle1 
 
 Contexts in which mass communications are practiced differ between nations. 
However, for Wilder, there is “sufficient experience”2 for specialists in this field to 
work on several hypotheses and suggestions applicable to differing scenarios. 
Wilder’s framework is very important for understanding a relatively 
understudied aspect of the Ford Foundation’s population control programs: the 
role of media messaging in propagating the planned, small family. In his attempt 
to set up a model of messaging that can be applied to numerous developing 
contexts, we see how the science of population control constructs the Global 
South as it is operationalized in varied nations.  
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It is no surprise that India was the first site for experimentations within global 
programs. India’s place in the international movement for population control has 
been crucial and well described in literature (Ledbetter 1984) (Rao 2004) 
(Connelly 2008). International philanthropic organizations, especially the 
Rockefeller Foundation and the Ford Foundation, have been crucial in shaping 
its national population policy, especially in the years after 1947. The Rockefeller 
Archive Center is therefore a pivotal archive to understand the statecraft of 
postcolonial India. Not only does the paper trail throw light on the kind of social 
experimentation that was part of the grants in India, but also provides thick 
descriptions of negotiations with the Indian bureaucrats, demographers, social 
scientists and political figures (Williams 2010) (Goswami Undated). It is within 
this context that Frank Wilder’s expert comments should be situated.  
 
This report describes the efforts of Frank Wilder and Dharmendra Kumar Tyagi 
to create an international symbol for family planning programs. This symbol 
circulated across the Global South in ways that could only be made possible 
through the Ford Foundation. The program, however, was short-lived. The report 
will outline the semiotic links of the symbol and the campaign around it to the 
idea of the city and provide possible responses to its cancellation. The period of 
my study is 1954-1978, and thereby, I mainly trace the Ford Foundation officers 
and the programs they supported within Family Planning. But there is immense 
overlap between the spheres of influence of the Rockefeller and Ford 
Foundations. However, the period and focus of my study, has been the ‘Hum Do 
Hamare Do’ (We are two, we will bear two) and the inverted “Red Triangle” 
campaigns.  
 
Going back to Wilder’s paper, he suggested three forms in which the media 
messages around family planning could be designed. The vague message was 
“Practice Family Planning.” This was followed by a generalization: “A Small 
Family is a Happy Family.” Finally, there was the national appeal, “For National 
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Progress, Plan Your Family.” The last statement clearly links the population 
control programme to the national developmental goals. It is in this manner that 
propaganda on family planning makes explicit certain underlying assumptions of 
controlling numbers. He elaborates on the inverted “Red Triangle”: 
 
A symbol like the Red Triangle, used wherever family planning is in 
evidence, acts so much as a reinforcement of the message that it must be 
considered a part of the message. Since the Red Triangle is the only such 
symbol in existence today, let us examine how it works as a 
communicating device…it has no prior meaning, good or bad. Thus, in 
the minds of the audience, it assumes only one meaning – Family 
Planning. Second, it is so simple in design that it can be quickly 
reproduced anywhere in the country without the need for artistic talent. 
It can indicate the location of family planning clinics, vehicles and other 
facilities of the program. Family Planning field personnel in the remotest 
areas can easily be distinguished when they wear this symbol. The Red 
Triangle is distinctive in shape, and because of its bright red color, it can 
be seen at great distances. It can also be used to mark contraceptive 
products. Most important of all for the developing countries, such a 
symbol can be verbalized – i.e., anyone can call it by name without the 
necessity for further communication about it.3 
 
There is something interesting about the way he envisions the symbol. He accepts 
the challenges of framing the message of family planning in diverse ways by 
creating a symbol, which is, in essence, empty of meaning. This could perhaps be 
the first use of the concept of branding a governmental policy. His symbol is 
unique in the way the intended audience gave their own meanings to it; its 
connection to family planning does not take away the agency of the recipient of 
this message. In other words, the audience is not a passive acceptor who is 
internalizing the message. They have the space to translate the idea in their own 
words and interpret the planned family in their own ways.  
R A C  R E S E A R C H  R E P O R T S  5 
 
 
As historians, we need to ‘read’ the messages and the media through which they 
circulated. This way, we can also revisit some of the conclusions that have been 
drawn around policies. Additionally, such a reading provides space for a 
secondary layer of analysis around the overpopulation logic and its insertions 
into other processes like modernisation and national economic 
developmentalism. This is important in order to address some ‘black holes’ of 
population control policies: questions like why did the policies lead to forced 
sterilizations to meet target demographic figures, concluding with the Emergency 
(1975-77) excesses. These excesses have been described extensively in existing 
scholarship. Emma Tarlo described the painful narratives of people who were 
forcefully taken to sterilization camps in different parts of Delhi (Tarlow 2003). 
Marika Vicziany and Matthew Connelly have shown the role that philanthropic 
organizations played in stressing demographic targets to be achieved by a certain 
cut-off date, which emboldened bureaucrats across the hierarchy to pursue these 
targets by coercion (Vicziany 1982-83) (Connelly 2006).  However, these 
explanations provide half-hearted answers to the reasons for the extent and scale 
of coercion that characterised the vasectomy camps. Also, the literature fails to 
explain how complex relations were between the program officers and their 
respective Indian counterparts. A question that has received scant attention is 
whether such a target-driven population control programme could have been 
avoided. In a ‘what-if’ analysis, it is pertinent to ask whether the forced 
sterilizations were inevitable and whether there were competing, alternative 
visions of family planning that could have avoided the path of coercive 
vasectomies.  
 
Seen this way, multiple questions arise from the organizational structures and 
priorities of the Ford Foundation in the decades after Independence. One key 
question is about the role of the consultants who visited the country for specific 
tasks and programs. Many times, they stayed for longer periods than originally 
intended. Often, they would bring their experiences from programs in other 
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developing countries and try to implement them in the immediate context. The 
consultants were very often doctors, epidemiologists, demographers and social 
scientists invited by the Foundation to address questions of design and 
distribution of grants that were suited to the aims of the project. I see these 
consultants and the reports they leave behind as artefacts of postcolonial history. 
To understand the modes of governance in the recently decolonized world, it is 
important to study the worldviews, stereotypes and assumptions that guided the 
consultants as they examined the problems at hand and provided solutions. In 
this sense, they were the documenters of history, who often juxtaposed their 
varied experiences in the developing world, thereby showing how ideas circulate 
and mutate in their journeys across different development paradigms. It also 
leads to a certain cross-fertilization of ideas that is unique to the post- ‘47 
governance in India.  
 
When Reuben Hill visited the India office in 1965, he described a rather 
confusing scenario. He states, “…both Indian and American professionals are 
discouraged and disenchanted with the progress of family planning in India.” 
And yet his impressions were optimistic: 
 
Population issues are now everywhere discussable and they are salient 
for many people in and out of government. Editorials, advertisements, 
debates in the state and central legislatures, and counter propaganda 
are observable. Posters about family planning adorn the walls in 
medical centers. Family Planning has sufficient priority to be allotted 
several million rupees from the central government and is beginning to 
get some state support. Even the Chinese invasion and the Pakistan war 
hasn’t held up the budget allocations. More serious is the failure to 
appoint personnel and the shortage of transports and supplies resulting 
in under-spending budgets.4    
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This forms the first page of Reuben Hill’s report. Several other reports reinforce 
his observations of lack of hands “on ground.” As N.J Demerath states, “There is 
a surfeit of organization blueprints, formalistic “chalking out,” funds “bodies” in 
place. Only by a practical management and leadership input on a large scale, 
can chaos and failure be avoided and a critical national goal be achieved.”5 
Calling for better relations between Ford consultants and Indian officials, Dr. 
David E. Price writes in 1967, “Many consultants had no Indian with whom to 
work in a collegial way; some were for this reason expected to play a 
managerial rather than a consultant role in creating a program…Several of the 
consultants had been recruited without precise knowledge of the nature of their 
assignments… recruitment had been completed before any agreement had been 
reached with Indian officials as to the nature of assignment.”6 Simultaneously, 
like Hill, there is immense appreciation of the propaganda efforts as he states, 
“Many new uses of mass communication have been introduced. Billboards and 
posters are commonplace. The national family planning symbol, the apex-down 
red equilateral triangle, is becoming almost as ubiquitous as the fading 
signature of National Malaria Eradication Program Spray teams!”7  
 
Price goes on to describe that the All India Radio was also becoming part of the 
innovations of the mass communication efforts.  
 
“A recent innovation uses the family planning budget to add a team of 
three to the staff of each of the twenty-two regional stations of All India 
Radio. Each team consists of an extension worker, a script-writer, and a 
reporter. Its purpose is to obtain the maximum impact for family 
planning in the station’s programming. Almost all the team members 
have recently attended a ten day workshop and are now assuming their 
duties.”8 
Simultaneously, there runs a thread of distrust towards the operational 
capabilities of the Indian counterparts, as is evidenced in this letter:  
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“We now have a reasonably well balanced set of equipment such as 
motion picture projectors, slide projectors, tape recorder, specialised 
projectors, portable loud speaker, screens etc. As you can appreciate, 
this equipment is delicate and requires careful handling and regular 
maintenance. I have kept a tight hand on it because when I came I 
observed a propensity, particularly on the part of the local staff, to 
throw the equipment about as if it were bags of wheat and to use it for 
private purposes. My secretary has carefully checked each item in and 
out as it has been used by our various staff members.”9 
 
Clearly, there runs a conceptual divide in the way the Ford Foundation functions 
vis-à-vis “local” population. Indians, be it staff or bureaucrat, were set to receive 
not only the skillsets, knowledge and machinery from the Foundation, but also a 
certain work ethic when they come onboard the Ford agenda. The consensus one 
can draw from the quotes cited above is an ambiguity in the way officials and 
staffs of two very different organizational structures were working within strict 
time and resource constraints. What brought them together was an overlap of 
concern and worry about population control and its implications for the national 
programme.  
 
Frank Wilder repeatedly complains about his Indian counterparts: “Our good 
mass communications talent, knowledge and experience alone will not break 
through the monstrous impediment of deep rooted, evil governmental practices 
in administration, finance and personnel selection and promotion.”10 Similarly, 
Douglas Ensminger, the Ford representative in India, and his family planning 
team in India said:  
  
 “India’s bureaucracy is filled with officers in an attitude of conformity 
and passive self-protection. (Emphasis in original) At all levels, Government 
officers are obsequious to superiors and imperious to subordinates. Their 
attitude combines a kind of Maharajah Syndrome and the professional 
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equivalent of the caste system. Nobody makes waves. This attitude works 
constantly and effectively against expressions of dynamism beyond the call of 
that sluggish bureaucracy. It shuts off the possibility of teamwork, for 
departures from the routine, for deserved praise. Above all it throttles ideas and 
actions. Government operations in India are a disastrous parody of efficient 
British bureaucracy…”11 
   
      --- 
 
There are several reasons that India’s efforts at mass communication were 
unique. Several innovations could be ascribed only to quick thinking on part of 
the programme officers and bureaucrats.  
 
“India’s brave radical departures in mass motivation techniques are 
worth study because they hold promise of unprecedented pay-offs at 
reasonable cost, within the pressing limits of national fertility control 
programs in the crucial developing countries. There may also be lessons, 
both for foreign aid agencies and host governments, in any development 
effort where success depends on wide public understanding and 
participation.” (Wilder and Tyagi 1968, 773) 
 
There are several reasons that Wilder was enthusiastic about India spearheading 
a unique effort in using mass media to propagate the values of population 
control. In a detailed article that he co-wrote with D K Tyagi, he recounts that the 
government by 1966 was leaning towards spending on combining “standard 
media (press, radio, motion pictures and printed materials) and any ‘outdoor’ 
visual medium they could lay their message on.” (Wilder and Tyagi 1968, 775) 
This meant the use of unconventional surfaces like “billboards, buses, 
matchboxes, rikshas, pocket calendars, newspaper and magazine 
advertisements, carnival banners, shopping bags, official village civic registers, 
telephone directories and… the exterior walls of buildings for huge lasting 
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paintings of the basic design. (Wilder and Tyagi 1968, 177) These statements 
show that Wilder’s efforts at creating a symbol were synchronous with the Indian 
government’s internal effort at creating a national programme that could 
transgress literacy and language barriers: 
 
“The Indian program must reach out to the minds of some 400 million 
persons. Illiteracy is widespread, incomes are low, and there is little 
built-in motivation toward family planning. Effective mass media in the 
vast rural areas, are insufficient. Under those conditions, the special 
characteristics of the Red Triangle seem to help advance the program 
insignificantly. First, it is distinctive. This means it will be identified in 
people’s minds only with family planning and with family planning 
services and products… In India, the Red Triangle always appears with 
the 2-or-3 children message and the four faces design.” (Wilder and 
Tyagi 1968, 778)   
 
In all, Wilder and Tyagi had proposed a concrete answer to the question, “Within 
limits of what is politically and practically possible, how can communication 
methods and media be used most effectively to help bring married couples in 
specific Asian countries to the regular, continued, and effective use of 
contraceptives, in order to space or limit births?”12 This question is of vital 
importance to the story of the population control programme in India, and the 
place of mass communications in it. The campaign of the “Red Triangle” was a 
uniquely Indian invention as opposed to an import from the West. Even as a Ford 
consultant helped build and create it, the Foundation did not seek to own the 
creative license of the project. As Frank Wilder states:  
 
“The difference between the family size desired by parents and the size 
desired by us (emphasis in original) has obvious vital meaning in 
shaping the approach and content of the mass, community and personal 
persuasion that will have to take place. As far as I know, only India has 
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mounted a mass communications effort that is centered totally on the 
direct appeal (or exhortation): “Two or Three Children; then Stop!” As 
and if traditional and political resistance melt, the Indians hope to move 
to a message even more powerful: “If You Have Two, That will Do!”13  
 
It can be gleaned from the paper trail that the campaign and distribution of 
contraceptives and knowledge about them were going hand in hand, namely, the 
condom, IUD and sterilization. Nirodh was the state-sponsored condom that was 
distributed for free in hospitals and Primary Health Centres and was as well 
publicised as the “Red Triangle” in the country. Thus a memo written in 
December 1970 states the following figures and prerogatives for such a campaign: 
 
“The extent of communication inputs in India’s Family Planning 
program is considerable. The 1969-74 Five Year Plan allocates about 8.3 
percent of the total family planning budget for mass communication, 
and an additional 21.7 percent of incentives to adopters, motivators and 
family planning staff. The Plan allocates 156,000 positions to family 
planning, which are supplemented by about 300,000 piece-rate aides; 
each of these individuals is a producer of interpersonal communication 
messages aimed at the receiving audience.  
India’s family planning communication program has largely 
accomplished one very important goal, but is yet faced with a much 
more difficult objective. The successful accomplishment is represented by 
the rather high percentage of the Indian population that is aware (1) of 
the family planning program (2) of the small family norm of two or 
three children, and (3) of such specific family planning innovations as 
Nirodh, IUD, and sterilization… However, the adoption (or Practice) 
effect of the family planning communication program in India has been 
relatively disappointing to date. While 75-90 percent of the target 
audience possess awareness knowledge, and most of these have 
favourable attitudes, adoption of the family planning methods is only 
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around 10-15 percent. Closing this so-called KAP-gap is the major 
communication task facing India’s family planning program today.”14  
(Emphasis in original).  
 
From the quote cited above, the significance that the “Red Triangle” campaign 
enjoyed in policy circles can be gleaned. The KAP studies could have been the 
reason, however, for the eventual decision to move away from mass 
communications-based programs to more medicalized, doctor-centric and 
sterilization-centric policies. This turn happened with the 1971 census, which 
showed that overall fertility rates had still not shown a significant decline. By this 
time the “Red Triangle” campaign was aborted. The reasons for doing so will be a 
focus of my doctoral research. 
 
Several sub-disciplines of demography emerged from the mass-communication 
propaganda efforts that have been described here. For instance, ‘Population 
Socialization,’ which is “the process through which culture (values, norms, roles) 
is transmitted and by which people learn all attitudes, facts, and behaviour 
related directly or indirectly to fertility, mortality and migration. It includes but 
is not limited to specific population education and communication efforts. It 
involves cognitive (beliefs, perceptions, knowledge) and affective learning 
within the family and outside it relevant to present and anticipated conditions; 
it is a sub-component of broader socialization processes."15 This discipline in 
particular was interested in studying the afterlife of propaganda campaigns.  
  
 “… these programs have not been adequately evaluated and have 
been based on assumptions that a) there is necessarily a direct 
relationship between knowledge and behaviour… b) knowledge can help 
override the influences of other sociocultural factors as well as 
personality characteristics. Much more should be learned about ‘folk 
demography,’ its contents and importance to the individual, in order to 
design better I E & C programs… (so that it does not appear that) 
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population education programs do not encourage active decision 
making based on evaluation of facts, but rather passive receptivity of 
alien norms and practices.”16   
  
Simultaneously, the idea that ‘information’ about family planning was crucial to 
its acceptance was beginning to percolate in governance circles, too. The analysis 
by the Planning Commission of the Family Planning Program in 1970 states:  
 
“People are likely to have feelings of ambivalence about family planning. 
Therefore, the programme of education and communication should be 
carried out on a continuous basis in order to overcome this tendency. 
This is supported from the fact that some of the adopters had postponed 
the operations/IUCD insertions for some reason or the other. Also, it was 
noted that the villagers were exposed to both negative and positive 
information regarding the different family planning methods. One of the 
important reasons given by the adopters for others not following their 
advice was said to be apprehensions and fear of consequences. 
Therefore, it is not surprising that analysis of achievement over a three 
year period at the village or block levels showed significant rise and 
fall.17 
 
From these excerpts, we can glean that the Ford officials were negotiating a chain 
of command which was spread across bureaucrats, scientists, demographers and 
social scientists. The hierarchical mode of governance was creating frictions in 
the way the Ford officials could contribute their ideas to a programme. The “Red 
Triangle” was an instance where such barriers were removed, and the ideation 
was synchronised between on official and his Indian counterpart. 
 
The journey of the “Red Triangle” was far from being limited to India. Wilder was 
successful in making it the international symbol for the family planning 
movement. It has become the symbol of the Family Planning Association of India 
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in recent years. The paper trail from the Rockefeller Archive Center indicates that 
the symbol crossed continents to be used in Nigeria. Under the section titled 
“Symbol for the Family Planning Council of Nigeria” a survey report states: 
 
“Respondents were presented with the Red Triangle symbol and were 
asked whether they knew what it represents. Approximately 20% of the 
national sample admitted they knew. Of this 20%, 34% could correctly 
identify it as the symbol of the Family Planning Council of Nigeria. 
Approximately 77% had not seen it before. Of the 23 % that claimed to 
have seen it before, 22% saw it on a road hoarding, 18% on a poster, and 
17% on a FPCN clinic. The duration of this recall ranged from “during 
this month” (30%), to “last month” (19%), and “3 to 6 months ago 
(13%).”18 
 
In conclusion, I reiterate that the inverted “Red Triangle” was an Indian effort 
towards creating an international symbol for the family planning movement. This 
story has been largely overlooked in histories of medicine, medical propaganda 
and studies on the Emergency (1975-77). This symbol has travelled far and wide, 
and the Rockefeller Archive Center has been a crucial site to discover its creation 
and rather unique journey across the Global South.  
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